Acquisition Program Lead Systems Integration/Lead Capabilities Integration Decision Support Methodology and Tool by Delbo, Theodore et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Acquisition Research Program Acquisition Research Symposium
2015-04-01
Acquisition Program Lead Systems
Integration/Lead Capabilities Integration
Decision Support Methodology and Tool
Delbo, Theodore; Thrasher, Darryl; Deaton, Jennifer
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/53669
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.












Acquisition Program Lead Systems Integration/Lead 
Capabilities Integration Decision Support Methodology 
and Tool 
Theodore Delbo, NAWCAD 
Darryl Thrasher, Lone Star Aerospace, Inc. 
Jennifer Deaton, Lone Star Analysis 
Published April 30, 2015 
Disclaimer: The views represented in this report are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 





The research presented in this report was supported by the Acquisition Research 
Program of the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval 
Postgraduate School. 
To request defense acquisition research, to become a research sponsor, or to print 
additional copies of reports, please contact any of the staff listed on the Acquisition 
Research Program website (www.acquisitionresearch.net).
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= - 91 - 
Acquisition Program Lead Systems Integration/Lead 
Capabilities Integration Decision Support Methodology 
and Tool1 
Theodore Delbo—is the Director, NAWCAD Enterprise Strategic Processes, Innovation and 
Analytics at Naval Air Warfare Center–Aircraft Division (NAWCAD). He is responsible for special 
strategic projects to enable NAWCAD to succeed in the future. Delbo holds a Bachelor of Science in 
mechanical engineering from Rutgers the State University of New Jersey, College of Engineering, 
with aerospace option, and is a certified acquisition professional. [theodore.delbo@navy.mil] 
Darryl Thrasher—is the Manager/Engagement Lead, Lone Star Aerospace Inc., and has over 30 
years of operations and program management experience in the aerospace, defense, and 
communications markets. He has extensive experience in manufacturing; operations; program 
management; and modeling, simulation, and analysis. Thrasher holds a Bachelor of Business 
Administration from Harding University with majors in accounting and management. [dthrasher@lone-
star.com] 
Jennifer Deaton—graduated from the University of Texas Arlington with a Bachelor of Science in 
business management and has worked for Lone Star Analysis for two years. Prior to joining Lone 
Star, Jennifer spent six years with Walmart Distribution and Logistics. Jennifer is responsible for the 
architecture, upgrades, and maintenance of the model. [jwilliams@lone-star.com] 
Abstract 
Naval Air Warfare Center–Aircraft Division (NAWCAD) wants to ensure that program offices 
derive the best value for their resources. These program offices need to understand their 
most effective cost, schedule, and performance-based solutions when faced with an 
acquisition requirement. Comparisons for sourcing are complex and require extensive 
decision support analysis to understand the solution space and foresight between original 
equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and government entities performing the Lead System 
Integrator (LSI) role. The research focused on the question, how can program managers best 
determine their acquisition source solutions in a timely and cost-effective manner?  
The method used was to develop a simulation tool to assist program offices in evaluating the 
relative risks of utilizing NAWCAD and commercial OEMs for various LSI roles and 
responsibilities. Lone Star Aerospace Inc. was tasked to develop a simulation tool to address 
highly complex issues for customers in NAVAIR.  
Eleven NAVAIR program managers (PMs) and 16 competency leads were interviewed, and 
other stakeholders were surveyed online. Risk drivers were codified into a model based on 
lessons learned from PMs’ experience. A prototype LSI directional tool was developed and 
demonstrated. Four beta tests were conducted on NAVAIR programs to stress the model’s 
capability and to identify potential improvements. 
Introduction 
Signed January 7, 2015, Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 5000.2 states 
under Enclosure 2: Program Management, 
                                            
 
 
1 NAVAIR Public Release SPR 2015-254 Distribution Statement A—Approved for public release; 
distribution is unlimited. 
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The Program Manager will develop and execute an approved Acquisition 
Strategy. This document is the Program Manager’s plan for program 
execution across the entire program life cycle. It is a comprehensive, 
integrated plan that identifies the acquisition approach and key framing 
assumptions, and describes the business, technical, and support strategies 
that the Program Manager plans to employ to manage program risks and 
meet program objectives. The strategy must reflect the Program Manager’s 
understanding of the business environment; technical alternatives; small 
business strategy; costs, risks and risk mitigation approach. The plan 
supports successful delivery of the capability at an affordable life-cycle price, 
on a realistic schedule. 
The business approach detailed in the Acquisition Strategy should be 
designed to manage the risks associated with the product being acquired. It 
should fairly allocate risk between industry and the government. The 
approach will be based on a thorough understanding of the risks associated 
with the product being acquired and the steps that should be taken to reduce 
and manage that risk. The business approach should be based on market 
analysis that considers market capabilities and limitations. The contract type 
and incentive structure should be tailored to the program and designed to 
motivate industry to perform in a manner that rewards achievement of the 
government’s goals. 
This development of an Acquisition Strategy by the PM has become increasingly 
complicated by operating in a VUCA environment. VUCA stands for volatility, uncertainty, 
complexity, and ambiguity. A growing body of research on VUCA—including the 2014 
dissertation of Dale Moore, Director of the Naval Air Warfare Center–Aircraft Division 
(NAWCAD) Strategic Cell—has recognized that a VUCA environment triggers more frequent 
strategic reorientations. When strategies change rapidly, organizations can flounder and 
resources can be wasted. When strategies do not adapt to the VUCA environment, they can 
become obsolete quickly, also triggering wasteful spending and suboptimal acquisition 
strategy, particularly for traditional program development lead times. 
At the Defense Acquisition University Small Business Hot Topic Forum on May 8, 
2013, Nickolas H. Guertin, PE DASN RDT&E, gave a brief on open systems architecture. 
The key message was that the legacy business model is one big program that equals one 
big contract and that a future business model will invoke competition across the life cycle 
using multiple acquisition sources. 
The NAVAIR Long-Range Strategy (LRS) identified government as Lead Systems 
Integrator (LSI) as a future desired state (Naval Air Systems Command [NAVAIR], 2013). It 
involves development and management of government-owned capability, based on 
technical standards and re-use of engineering and test results associated with those 
standards to reduce acquisition cost.  
In Better Buying Power 3.0 (BBP 3.0), Frank Kendall asserts, “Nothing is more 
important to our success than our professional ability to understand, think critically, and 
make sound decisions about the complex and often highly technical matters defense 
acquisition confronts” (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics [OUSD(AT&L)], 2014), Underpinning BBP 3.0 is the growing concern that the 
United States’ technological superiority over potential adversaries is being threatened today 
in a way that we have not seen for decades. 
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This new and focused BBP 3.0 initiative will strengthen the Department’s organic 
military and government civilian technical expertise. The Department cannot be an effective 
customer for technical excellence and innovation if we do not embody those characteristics 
fully in our own workforce. We cannot make decisions about technology if we don’t fully 
understand what is possible and how to achieve it. 
In an ITEA Journal article, “DoD Labs, Navy Warfare Centers are Untapped 
Resources,” RDML Michael Moran and SES Scott O‘Neil discuss the 89% industry activity 
and the 11% government (Navy data) and how that needs to be re-examined along with 
considering more LSI work and leveraging in-house assets. Currently, the government 
workforce is not fully positioned to assume the LSI role on a broad scale, but if we engage 
early in the technical development efforts, whenever it makes sense, we can build a robust 
capability. Although this paper is specifically focused on experiences at Naval Air Warfare 
Center Weapons Division, there is anecdotal evidence showing that these issues are typical 
of many Navy/DoD warfare centers and laboratories. 
Purpose and Research Question 
The purpose of this qualitative research study is twofold. First is to provide PMs with 
a simulation tool to assist program offices in evaluating the relative merits and risks of 
utilizing NAWCAD and commercial OEMs for various LSI/LCI roles and responsibilities. 
Second is to understand where the government (NAWCAD) lacks competitiveness on the 
capability to perform LSI (identify the gaps). The research focused on the question, how can 
program managers best determine their acquisition source solutions in a timely and cost-
effective manner?  
NAWCAD wants to ensure that the program offices that it supports derive the best 
value for their resources. These program offices need to understand their most effective 
cost, schedule, and performance-based solutions when faced with an acquisition 
requirement. Comparisons for sourcing are complex and require extensive decision support 
analysis to understand the solution space and direct more detailed cost estimates between 
OEMs and government entities performing the LSI role or Lead Capabilities Integration (LCI) 
role.  
Methodology 
Extensive market research was conducted with leading edge technology, best 
practices, and analytical competitors like Lone Star Aerospace Inc., IBM, Decision Lens, 
Defense & Security Technology Group Inc., and Deloitte’s Highly Immersive Visual 
Environment (HIVE). Additionally, a literature review was conducted to research state of the 
art publications, articles, and industry Communities of Interest (COI). Lone Star Aerospace 
Inc. was tasked to develop an LSI directional tool to assess Courses of Action (CoA) and 
provide relative risks of utilizing NAWCAD and OEMs.  
The use of an appropriate decision process is important to provide best outcomes. 
During the execution of this research, the best practice of the Dialogue Decision Process 
from the Handbook of Decision Analysis was used (Parnell et al., 2013, Section 5.3). The 
dialogue decision process is a decision process that focuses on a structured dialogue 
between the Decision Board and Project Team. This was accomplished through several 
meetings that included a kick-off meeting, interim review meeting, LSI Directional Tool 
Demo/Feedback meeting, and the beta test out-brief.  
A kick-off meeting for the LSI decision model was held October 24, 2013, with 
NAWCAD leadership, stakeholders, and subject matter experts (SMEs). The purpose was to 
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reach consensus on the model requirements, to establish support, synchronize, and provide 
guidance on alternatives and project strategy. 
Model Requirements 
The directional model needed to be able to assess roles, responsibilities, and 
functions of key entities and the elements that support those functions. The model also 
needed to be able to differentiate between two or more alternatives and be used across the 
entire life cycle or a portion of a program. This discrimination was a prelude to detailed 
planning which followed the analysis conducted with this model. The minimum areas for the 
model to assess in each Course of Action (CoA) were cost, schedule, technical 
performance, capability, and staffing risks. It also needed to be scalable to support all 
program types, as well as be validated on beta project(s). 
Specifically, tools, processes, and analysis needed to provide insight to efforts being 
planned or performed, with emphasis on cost, time, labor mix, risk, and performance as key 
measures. The tool needed to be designed as a decision aid and was not meant to supplant 
or replace Program Executive Office (PEO), Program Management Air (PMA), or NAVAIR 
support systems. 
An LSI decision model preliminary interim review meeting was held November 13, 
2013. The preliminary interim review provided SME feedback on the proposed LSI decision 
model architecture, synchronized expectations, and provided guidance on next steps. 
Attendees conducted a review of the developing government LSI Decision Tool. The high 
level approach included Course of Actions (CoAs) based on MIL-STD-881 Work Breakdown 
Structure (WBS) level 2/3 and establishes a technical baseline that is consistent across all 
CoAs. High level model architecture included Control Panels, Baseline WBS Lv 2/3, Revised 
Baseline WBS Lv 2/3, Contractor Capabilities, Government Capabilities, and Decision 
Metrics.  
SME Interviews 
The next step in the process was to conduct SME interviews. This step provided 
insight into the merit of approach and architecture. The support and feedback received 
previous insights that were placed into a model influence diagram that was then developed 
into a mathematical structure with 98% of the math completed and the remaining notional 
data loaded into the demonstration. 
Eleven NAVAIR deputy program managers and 16 competency leads were 
interviewed and other stakeholders were surveyed online. The results were used to codify 
risk drivers into the model based on lessons learned from PMs’ experience. Program 
managers, deputy program managers, and competency leads were selected with the 
following criteria: (1) performed in a senior acquisition program management role, to include 
program manager or deputy program manager positions for over two years; (2) operated at 
a senior level of the organization (military 0-6/civilian GS-15, or equivalent) with significant 
responsibility; and (3) was involved with and responsible for developing and conceptualizing 
long-term acquisition program strategies and plans. Competency leads were selected for 
their technical expertise and knowledge.  
Data was collected through 30-minute interviews with PMs and 60-minute interviews 
with competency leads. The interview sought to understand PMA perspectives and 
experiences in assessing entity role selection when planning and executing a project or 
program. An “entity” is an organization (industry or government) performing a significant role 
in a system or program. The interviews were conducted using the identified best practices in 
the Handbook of Decision Analysis as a guide (Parnell et al., 2013, Section 4.6).  
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Interview Questions 
The interview questions were as follows: 
1. When structuring the roles and responsibilities of various entities (across 
industry and government) in a program, what is your vision and/or objective 
when determining who has which roles and responsibilities? 
2. We are tasked to look at Cost, Schedule, and Performance as criteria. 
a. What aspects of these three do you believe are the most important? 
b. What other criteria do you feel are important when assessing these 
roles and responsibilities? 
3. Can you share an example of where an allocation of roles and 
responsibilities among entities has been defined and implemented well? 
4. How was the lead role distributed among these entities? 
5. How big of a factor are the “values” of the entity to you when determining the 
structure of the program as it relates to the roles and responsibilities? 
6. What issues define compatibility among the entities that must collaborate for 
a successful program? In particular, what enables two or more entities to 
successfully create a systems capability? 
7. Can you share an example of where an allocation of roles and 
responsibilities among entities has not been defined and implemented well? 
8. What metrics are you held accountable to when executing a program? 
a. What is the source of the metric requirement? 
b. Where does the data for those metrics reside? 
c. Which of these metrics are most useful to you in executing your 
program? 
d. Which of these metrics provides any insight to the successful 
allocation of roles and responsibilities of the entities on your program? 
Prototype LSI Directional Tool 
An LSI Directional Tool Demo/Feedback meeting was held February 5, 2014. 
Attendees were both PMAs and NAWCAD leadership. The prototype LSI directional tool 
was developed to demonstrate user input and output formats. The purpose of the 
demonstration was to gather the voice of the customer for feedback, recommended 
changes, and improvements, and to synchronize expectations before locking into a final 
configuration and to identify the PMAs’ desire to conduct beta tests. 
Although the demonstrated model had notional data loaded, it demonstrated the 
effectiveness of the tool. Lone Star conducted surveys of the PMA, and competency and 
subject matter experts throughout industry to quantify the real world impacts to cost, 
schedule, and performance based on capability and program assessments. The survey data 
represented a quantified representation of the real world experience of program managers, 
competency leads, and industry SMEs. The information received subsequently replaced the 
notional data utilized prior to beta testing. Additionally, it was pointed out that NAWCAD is 
pursuing 21st century methodologies and tools to perform its mission in the future. These 
include product lifecycle management tools, digital engineering, cloud computing, data 
fusion, model-based research, and engineering, prototyping, and agile systems engineering, 
in which historical data does not exist. 
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The prototype allows a program manager to establish a Baseline CoA based on the 
program’s level 2/3 WBS for cost, schedule, and performance. 
The initial CoA can be anywhere on the continuum provided in Figure 1. The PM or 
Integrated Program Team (IPT) can evaluate potential CoAs for any combination of 
government or industry LSI activity at the system, sub-system, or component level. 
 
 Courses of Action on a Continuum 
Once the inputs are made for the Baseline CoA, the program IPT completes an 
assessment of the Baseline CoA in the following areas that drive risk: 
 Technical complexity (TRL) and component or software re-use 
 System complexity 
 Program complexity 
 Contract type 
 Contract award time 
 Integration readiness  
 Proprietary data rights  
 Competency of personnel 
 Availability of personnel 
 Facility readiness 
 Security clearance status 
 Pass through cost 
These assessments result in a risk assessment of the Baseline CoA relative to the 
Baseline Inputs. Subsequent CoAs can then be assessed based on the reallocation of work 
between OEMs, the government, or another OEM. These CoAs can then be compared to 
each other to determine the relative risk of each CoA, as well as the most feasible course of 
action to take. 
Risk Assessment Descriptions 
Technical Complexity (TRL) and Component or Software Re-Use 
The Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) framework was developed to assess 
the maturity of technology elements via the established metrics of Technology Readiness 
Levels (TRLs). The TRL metric assigns a ranking to the maturity of the technology element 
using specific evaluation criteria; the scale can be used to assess the risk of developing and 
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transitioning new technologies in the context of a larger system acquisition. The framework 
of Re-Use is similar to TRL and assesses the percentage of re-use for any given WBS 
development effort. 
TRL Levels 
 TRL 1—Basic principles observed and reported  
 TRL 2—Technology concept and/or application formulated  
 TRL 3—Analytical and experimental critical function and/or characteristic 
proof-of concept  
 TRL 4—Component/subsystem validation in laboratory environment  
 TRL 5—System/subsystem/component validation in relevant environment  
 TRL 6—System/subsystem model or prototyping demonstration in a relevant 
end-to-end environment (ground or space)  
 TRL 7—System prototyping demonstration in an operational environment 
(ground or space)  
 TRL 8—Actual system completed and “mission qualified” through test and 
demonstration in an operational environment (ground or space)  
 TRL 9—Actual system “mission proven” through successful mission 
operations (ground or space)  
Re-Use Levels 
1 = Less than 10% 
2 = 10-% - 20% 
3 = 20% - 30% 
4 = 30% - 40% 
5 = 40% - 50% 
6 = 50% - 60% 
7 = 60% - 70% 
8 = 70% - 80% 
9 = 80% - 90% 
10 = Greater than 90% 
Once the detail hardware/software elements of each WBS are assessed, a System 
TRL and System Re-Use are computed based on weighting those elements based on cost. 
The derived System level TRL and Re-Use has proven effective in determining the level of 
risk to cost and schedule of a given CoA. 
System Complexity 
The work indicated that while TRL and Re-Use are important criteria and both should 
be considered and can be successfully modeled, a reliable method for categorizing system 
complexity to a usable scale for programs and products in government and industry is 
needed for objective planning and analysis.  
System complexity has two dimensions: 
 Dimension 1—Product & Context Complexity (Functions) 
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Lone Star Aerospace Inc. adapted research results from the MIT Sloan School that 
provide a relative complexity score for functions (Product and Context Complexity). The 
PMA assesses the complexity of the function of the system based on the following criteria:  
1 = A part or component with a single function and one interface type 
2 = A sub-assembly or mechanism, composed of #1s, with one or a few 
functions, and few interface types (these can be nested—sub-assemblies 
can merge to create more complex things that are still rated 2); a circuit 
board is a 2. 
3 = A machine, apparatus, or functional item, composed of #2’s which may 
have multiple, complex functions, and may have many interface types. 
Pacemakers, server blades and laser guided bombs are all 3’s. 
4 = A system or complex apparatus composed of 3’s with highly complex 
functionally and diverse interface types. Communications satellites, air 
traffic control radars, airliners, telecom switches, and core network routers 
are all examples of 4’s. 
5 = A system of systems, composed of 4’s (and lower complexity products). A 
telecom network, major airport, and carrier battle group are examples of 
5’s. 
 Dimension 2—Interface Complexity & Information Diversity 
For Interface Complexity/Information Diversity, the PMA will make an assessment on 
the complexity based on the following criteria: 
1 = An interface of a single type, single purpose, and low information diversity 
2 = An interface of 1 to 3 types, 1 to 3 purposes, and with low information 
diversity 
3 = An interface more complex than #2 in only one or two descriptors 
4 = An interface exceeding the complexity of #2 in all three descriptors 
5 = An interface managing many #4’s 
When system complexity attributes are accounted for along with TRL and Re-Use, it 
provides program managers the ability to better plan for cost and schedule risk in their 
program as they develop program plans. 
Program Complexity 
Based on feedback through the interview process, the researchers determined that 
Program Complexity had two dimensions, namely customer complexity and supplier 
complexity. As each CoA is defined, the resultant structure of the program changes based 
on the number of pieces that might need to be managed. Lone Star developed a 
methodology to determine the impact to changes in the complexity of managing the program 
based on the CoA being evaluated.  
Customer complexity consists of three components: 
 The number and type of customers ranging from a single DoD customer to 
multiple DoD and international customers  
 The number of contracts or contracting documents from that customer to be 
managed  
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 Whether the program is a development effort or is in production 
Supplier complexity consists of two components: 
 The types of supplier contracts to be managed, ranging from all “Build to 
Print” to all “Development” contracts  
 The relationship with and between suppliers 
Different CoAs will result in numbers of customers/suppliers, as well as the nature of 
the relationships required to execute a program. By accounting for the impact of these 
differences, the PM is better able to understand and manage the potential impacts to cost 
and schedule of any CoA. 
Contract Type 
A relationship between Contract Type and Contract Cost were established based on 
prior Lone Star research. The ability to execute within budget is impacted depending on the 
contract type utilized on a subcontract. Five contract types that are modeled include the 
following: 
 Firm Fixed Price 
 Firm Fixed Price w/ Simplistic Incentive Fee 
 Firm Fixed Price w/ PMF Incentive Fee, Incentives, and Process Authority 
 Cost Plus Fixed Fee 
 Cost Plus w/ PMF Incentive Fee, Incentives, and Process Authority 
Different CoAs will result in different quantities and sizes of contracts to be issued 
and managed. One CoA could have one large prime contract, while another could have 
multiple smaller contracts. While smaller contracts can result in smaller contracting cycle 
time, the people required to support multiple awards may or may not be available. 
Additionally, the PMA may or may not have sufficient insight or knowledge about the supply 
chain to support multiple awards. 
Contract Award Time 
Based on planning factors from Procurement Administrative Lead Time (PALT), the 
researchers modeled an estimated cycle time for contracting to be measured against a 
planned baseline. Historical contract cycle time is based on the following: 
 Contract PALT # 
 Contract PALT Type 
 Contract Competitive/Any Value 
 Contract Defined Price 
 Contract Re-Use 
 Contracting Resources 
This provides the PM with insight to the cycle time required to get any given CoA 
under contract to begin execution. 
Integration Readiness 
Integration Readiness was based on Integration Readiness Criteria from AIR 4.1 and 
an Integration White Paper from Jennifer Long (2011). While TRL and Re-Use are important 
criteria and provide insight to the relative risk of a set of CoAs, the ability to integrate 
hardware and software together can pose significant risk to program execution if not 
accounted for in the evaluation of each CoA. 
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An Integration Readiness Level (IRL) assessment was developed that relates the 
“integration characteristics” of configuration items to integration risk levels. The assessment 
was structured along the same lines as the system complexity assessment, but was 
intended to allow assessment of the risk associated with software and hardware 
development of configuration items (CIs). 
Proprietary Data Rights 
DoDI 5000.2 (DoD, 2015) states under Enclosure 2: Program Management,  
(4) Intellectual Property (IP) Strategy and Open Systems Architectures.  
Program management must establish and maintain an IP Strategy to identify 
and manage the full spectrum of IP and related issues (e.g., technical data 
and computer software deliverables, patented technologies, and appropriate 
license rights) from the inception of a program and throughout the life cycle.  
The IP Strategy will describe, at a minimum, how program 
management will assess program needs for, and acquire competitively 
whenever possible, the IP deliverables and associated license rights 
necessary for competitive and affordable acquisition and sustainment over 
the entire product life cycle, including by integrating, for all systems, the IP 
planning elements required by subpart 207.106 (S-70) of the Defense 
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (Reference (al)) for major 
weapon systems and subsystems thereof.  
The IP Strategy will be updated throughout the entire product life 
cycle, initially as part of the Acquisition Strategy, and during the Operations 
and Support Phase as part of the Life-Cycle Sustainment Plan.  
Program management is also responsible for evaluating and 
implementing open systems architectures, where cost effective, and 
implementing a consistent IP Strategy. This approach integrates technical 
requirements with contracting mechanisms and legal considerations to 
support continuous availability of multiple competitive alternatives throughout 
the product life cycle. 
Competency and Availability of Personnel 
People Readiness was characterized as having two components, including 
personnel competency and availability. The PMA is required to make an assessment to 
determine whether an executing entity has the competency and availability to perform the 
expected work by utilizing a Likert assessment scale calculated as follows.  
 Competency:  
1 = No competency, sourcing can be obtained 
2 = Some competency with major additions needed 
3 = Most competencies with few additions needed 
4 = Most competencies with minor additions 
5 = All competencies are capable  
 Availability: 
1 = None available, sourcing can be obtained 
2 = Some available with major additions needed 
3 = Most available with few additions needed 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= - 101 - 
4 = Most available with minor additions 
5 = All personnel are available 
Facility Readiness 
Facilities Readiness uses a Likert scale assessment of the facilities available to do 
the work, including Security readiness. The PMA will select whether an executing entity has 
1 = None available, sourcing can be obtained 
2 = Some available with major additions needed 
3 = Most available with few additions needed 
4 = Most available with minor additions 
5 = All facilities available 
Security Clearance Status 
Clearance Availability is a Likert scale assessment of the availability of cleared 
people to do the work. The PMA will be able to select whether an executing entity has 
1 = None available, sourcing can be obtained 
2 = Some available with major additions needed 
3 = Most available with few additions needed 
4 = Most available with minor additions 
5 = All cleared people available 
By assessing the People, Facilities, and Clearance Availability of each executing 
entity of a given CoA, the program manager has the insight to the resources available to 
execute that CoA. Resource availability has a significant impact on the ability to meet 
schedule and ultimately cost. This assessment not only provides insight to schedule and 
cost risk to the program manager, the aggregation of this data provides NAWCAD with 
insight to resource areas that need to be developed or improved. 
Pass Through Cost 
Significant program savings may be realized when the government performs as a 
competitive, qualified LSI. AIR 4.2 Should Cost data shows that the representative supply 
chain profit is a substantial portion of the total weapon system’s cost. This assumes a four 
tier supply chain, in which both profits decrease in lower tiers, and the percentage of 
outsourced materials decrease in lower tiers. There is an opportunity to assess all pass 
through rates using historical data across NAVAIR programs. This provides options for 
consideration for PMA acquisition decisions.  
Allowing for Potential Variation in Impact Areas 
Since the inputs, assessments, and impacts to those assessments are not 
deterministic, the variation in inputs and assessment impacts are accounted for in the 
modeling and simulation process. 
 
 Lead Time Required to Put Contract Vehicle in Place 
The variation in potential data inputs to the model is captured by 50,000 Monte Carlo 
runs pulling a distribution of the data. This is called 10-base-90 format for the data. The 
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example given here in Figure 2 is for the lead time required to put a contract vehicle in 
place. During team assessments, the facilitator will ask the following questions: 
 What is the minimum amount of time it could take to get on contract? 
 What is the maximum amount of time it could take to get on contract? 
 10% of the time, how bad could it be? 
 10% of the time, how good could it be? 
 What is a nominal realistic expectation of contract award timeline? 
This creates dialogue and drives consensus on the appropriate distribution recorded 
into the model. The 10-base-90 format for the data is available for population across all risk 
drivers in the model. If required, the assessment team can reach back to the potential 
executing entities for insight on the risk driver in question. 
This Monte-Carlo approach provides a distribution of potential LSI CoAs for the PM, 
evaluated from relative cost risk, schedule risk, and performance risk of potential outcomes. 
The relative risk curve is made up of 50,000 points representing 50,000 potential outcomes 
for a CoA. 
These assessments result in a risk assessment of the Baseline CoA relative to the 
Baseline Inputs. Subsequent CoAs can then be assessed based on the reallocation of work 
between OEMs, the government, or another OEM. These CoAs can then be compared to 
each other to determine the relative risk of each CoA, as well as the most feasible course of 
action to take. 
The prototype LSI directional tool was determined to be ready for beta testing. The 
beta testing included four programs of record that resulted in positive dialogue and 
participation.  
Beta Project  
Beta Test Objectives 
Beta test objectives were designed to demonstrate the following: 
 Model functionality in an operational environment with the Program 
Management office in the acquisition process 
 Incorporate lessons learned from the beta programs into architectural 
changes to the model 
 Identify and modify model reporting and graphics required for PMA use in the 
acquisition process 
 Demonstrate directional merits of various courses of action regarding roles 
and responsibilities of executing entities enabling improved decision-making 
by NAVAIR leadership and PMs 
Beta Criteria 
The optimal beta programs selection was for the LSI model to test a diverse cross 
section of NAVAIR types of programs to exercise the different modules within the model and 
push the boundaries of the model’s capability to identify areas for potential architectural 
improvement. The beta programs varied the degrees of technical, program, and system 
complexity, and considered different current and future program phases. The intent was to 
thoroughly explore cost, schedule, and performance questions as they evaluated CoAs and 
be scoped to fit into a six-week evaluation period.  
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Beta Programs 
Optimal beta programs were selected based on a cross section of NAVAIR 
programs. They exercised different modules within the model and stressed the model’s 
capability to identify areas for potential improvement. The beta programs had varying 
technical, program, and system complexity. Four programs of record were selected.  
Beta Test Out-Brief 
During beta testing, the model demonstrated the ability to rapidly change the WBS to 
be tailored by each program, and ran several CoAs running per day with each PMA. The 
results of the model runs were both informative and validated the survey data. The overall 
PMA responses were positive and it was recognized that the tool has application beyond 
LSI decisions. Beta test feedback indicated its usefulness for programmatic “what-if” 
analysis and other PMA decisions such as funding drills, Source Selection, and so forth. 
Beta tests were completed and out-briefed on August 27, 2014. An implementation plan was 
approved for future deployment. 
Pilot Test With NAVAIR Programs 
Future work includes conducting four pilot test programs as part of the deployment 
strategy. As of the date of this research paper, the pilots were not yet complete and are not 
included herein.  
Findings 
This section describes the findings of qualitative research involving 11 NAVAIR 
program managers (PMs) and 16 competency leads who met the specified criteria for this 
study related to their experience with acquisition. The findings were derived from 27 
interviews and an online stakeholder survey. Risk drivers were codified into a model based 
on lessons learned from the PMs’ experience. A prototype LSI/LCI directional tool was 
developed and beta tested on a cross-section of NAVAIR programs. This was conducted 
over a 10-month period. The composite findings described in this section include the 
participants’ characterization and Lone Star Aerospace Inc. experience and expertise.  
Beta Test Summary 
The time invested by the IPTs who participated in the beta tests was approximately 
three days scheduled across four calendar days: a half-day introduction, two days of data 
gathering, and a half day of running the model. The model was quickly tailored to assess the 
relative risk impacts for each LSI approach. The model quantitatively demonstrated relatively 
low risk for government LSI approaches for one of the PMA-led efforts in which known 
contributions to risk were accurately predicted. The model was used in conversation with 
other PMAs to quantitatively demonstrate PMA success and compare government 
approaches to industry alternatives. The ability to execute multiple CoAs was demonstrated, 
allowing for “what-if” CoA assessments prior to execution to assess the relative risk of each 
proposed approach. The structured process of discussing and inputting the various options 
also led to better overall IPT understanding of the risks associated with each approach. 
Observed Benefits for the Program IPT  
Programmatic areas of assessment are based on known risk drivers and lessons 
learned from current program managers and IPTs. Potential LSI CoAs for the PM are 
evaluated from cost risk, schedule risk, and performance risk perspectives. The PMA should 
conduct the assessments as a group or team in the disciplined manner with the aid of the 
LSI/LCI directional tool. It is critical to have the right people in the room during the 
assessment. Key SMEs include the PM, technical experts, acquisition expert, AIR 4.2 
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Should Cost expert, IPT lead, and supply chain expert. The tool captures past IPT 
experience, perspectives, and insight applied to making future programmatic decisions. This 
creates rich evaluations and assessments of program areas that may not be discussed 
otherwise. It provides a quantitative and systematic means of making acquisition strategy 
decisions. The artifacts generated are defendable and provide a consistent means of 
communicating acquisition strategies to leadership and stakeholders. The key is the learning 
that occurs across the entire IPT as CoAs are run, iterated, and evaluated.  
Observed Benefits for the Warfare Center 
It is expected that once deployed, the aggregated data from different acquisition 
category (ACAT)–type programs will deliver key characteristics and insights that lead to 
programs choosing industry over the warfare center as an LSI. It should identify gaps in 
workforce competencies and arm government decision-makers with actionable knowledge 
to set strategy to become a competitive LSI. Analysis of aggregated data should illuminate 
policy limitations that prevent government-as-LSI decisions. It should provide leadership 
with the ability to make informed decisions on the hiring and training of personnel and 
support the creation of data-driven strategies for growth and improvement.  
Interpretations, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
The concept of providing a useful tool to the PMA for programmatic decisions that 
also allows NAWCAD to aggregate data on NAWC capabilities, people, and facilities proved 
to be extremely insightful. The model delivered LSI risk assessments as intended, with 
useful feedback to the PMA and NAWC in the beta phase. The PMA response in the beta 
phase was positive beyond intended LSI decisions, and the feedback indicated value for 
programmatic “what-if” analysis for other PMA decisions such as funding drills, sources 
selection, and so forth.  
Based on the feedback, an architecture change to increase the skill set fidelity is 
currently being implemented along with IRL, Proprietary Data, and Pass Through cost. This 
will result in Version 1.1 that is ready for PMA use throughout NAWC. Version 1.1 will be 
deployed to institutionalize this new capability within the PMA community. This will provide 
the PMA community with immediate access to all “what-if” programmatic analyses, along 
with the quantitative back up necessary to support programmatic decisions. 
The data generated by this tool also provides a basis for the manpower skill set 
requirements across different program types for both the PMA and NAWC. It will help 
NAWC to establish hiring, training, and knowledge management goals to meet its 
customers’ requirements. Organic integration capabilities provided by NAWC will then be 
improved to better support the PMA. Overall, the best value mix of government, OEM, and 
support contractors can be achieved. 
It is recommended that a Version 1.2 be developed that provides a Web-Based 
Programmatic Decision Tool. This will provide the basis for enculturation across all of 
NAVAIR. The large data set of CoA analysis will provide NAWC with the information to 
support different ACAT-type programs more effectively in the areas of design, development, 
test, production, or sustainment based on what is the best value mix of government, OEM, 
and support contractors for the warfighter and the taxpayer. The research focused on the 
question, how can program managers best determine their acquisition source solutions in a 
timely and cost-effective manner? Although the LCI/LSI question was the rationale for the 
modeling, the simulation tool additionally allows comparison of a wide range of program 
structure alternatives through WBS tailoring. It was recommended that the tool has 
application far beyond LSI decisions.  
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Concluding Thoughts 
The identification, development, and implementation of the Programmatic Decision 
Tool for LSI decisions followed a Dialogue Decision Process. It provides the PMA and 
NAWC with a tool necessary for adapting efficiently and effectively in a VUCA environment 
by facilitating collaborative decision-making with quantifiable rationale, providing the 
warfighter and taxpayer with the best value solution for LSI and other programmatic 
decisions. 
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